Energy Security and Terrorism

The September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States by the Al-Qaeda group have raised the specter that future terrorist assaults could be made against U.S. energy infrastructure. The subject is not new. Oil companies operating in Columbia have suffered attacks against pipelines and other facilities by guerillas operating in that strife-torn country. However, it is new for the United States.

Although electrical/nuclear power plants might be considered especially vulnerable targets, certainly oil refineries and, to a lesser extent, oil and gas pipelines are potential targets as well. New efforts are being made to increase physical security around these facilities, but it is a daunting task. Cyber attacks against energy systems are also a possibility.

The analysis of energy infrastructure vulnerabilities has begun and will require extensive government– industry cooperation. A new Office of Energy Assurance was created soon after September 11, 2001, in the DOE, but it may be folded into the new Department of Homeland Security if endorsed by Congress.

Although physical security can be strengthened at large power plants and petroleum refineries, it will undoubtedly be impossible to protect power lines and pipeline systems from attack. Instead, strategies need to be developed to promote redundancies and reserves in our energy systems to be able to respond to interruptions and reinstate normal service as quickly as possible.

A study of this subject by the U.S. Energy Association, ‘‘National Energy Security Post 9/11,’’ recommends some initial actions, which require the application of advanced energy technologies. First, detailed risk assessments need to be made of North American energy system vulnerabilities to terrorism, which might be called probabilistic vulnerability assessments, and corresponding countermeasures. Second, because many existing control systems are linked to the Internet and are therefore vulnerable to cyber attacks, steps should be taken to develop secure, private communications networks for energy systems, with adequately protected back- up systems. Third, with regard to the widely dispersed electricity grid, which is particularly vulnerable, a more flexible strategy of intelligent ‘‘islanding’’ is needed to minimize the impacts of an attack, along with self-healing mechanisms.

For major energy facilities, there is a need to develop and install sensors to detect dangerous biological and chemical agents, which might be released in cooling towers, and to identify and deploy c